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Informed consent is a central concept for empirical and theoretical research concerning 
pregnancy management decisions and is often taken to be one of the more fundamental 
goals of the profession of genetic counseling. Tellingly, this concept has been seen by 
disability communities as salutary, despite longstanding critiques made by disability 
activists, advocates, and scholars concerning practices involved in genetic counseling 
more generally. In this chapter, we show that the widespread faith in informed consent is 
misleading and can be detrimental to the practice of genetic counseling as guided by 
concerns of justice and equity. We proceed in two steps. First, we explain how informed 
consent is flawed as a practical concept. Second, we show how the inadequacy of 
informed consent illuminates the animating core of disability critiques of genetic 
counseling: the issue of ableism. We argue that the problem of ableism cannot be solved 
with informed consent because it is not a problem of information, but of epistemic 
frameworks. We suggest that what we call critically informed consent is better suited to 
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Disability rights activists and scholars have long posed critiques of and challenges to 
prenatal genetic testing (Parens and Asch 2003). These include, for example, arguments 
that the practice of prenatal testing invariably judges certain disabled lives to be not 
worthy or less worthy of living or that its effect, regardless of questions of judgment, is 
the prevention of certain people with disabilities from coming into being.1 Importantly, 
calls for greater attention to the complexity of disability as well as calls for greater 
incorporation of the experiential testimony of various disability communities have for 
many years now also become increasingly common from inside the practice of prenatal 
genetic counseling (Farrelly et al. 2012; Sanborn and Patterson 2014; Madeo et al. 2011; 
Gould et al. 2019; Boardman 2020). Whether coming from inside or outside, these calls 
often assume that genetic counselors’ responsibilities to disability communities revolve 
around dialogue, understanding, and representation. It is further assumed that remedying 
these communicative and symbolic issues will satisfy longstanding needs for 
improvement, especially with respect to communication practices designed to secure 
informed consent. In this chapter, we hope to build upon the profession of genetic 
counseling’s laudable engagement with disability critiques by showing why informed 
consent is not enough and how this issue might be fixed.2   
In short, we argue that informed consent, while undoubtedly crucial to the 
provision of just care, can in fact reinforce unjust epistemic frameworks—patterns of 
thinking—when treated as an endpoint instead of a starting point.3 We suggest that what 
we call critically informed consent (CIC) is needed in order for such unjust epistemic 
frameworks to be meaningfully addressed. Our focus in this chapter will be upon 
epistemic frameworks rooted in ableism. Ableism is a prejudice (analogous, but distinct 
from prejudices involved in sexism, racism, or homophobia, et al.) that presumes the 
“normal” able-body is better than an “abnormal” disabled-body. This prejudice leads to a 
wide range of social ramifications, from employment discrimination, to hate crimes, to 
poor patient-provider communication, to social oppressions that include such basic things 
as barring entry to a building because one uses a wheelchair for mobility or failing to 
provide closed captioning. In what follows, we discuss critically informed consent as a 
tool for anti-ableist genetic counseling, an approach to genetic counseling that is 
committed not just to informedness, but also to the idea that genetic counselors and their 
clients should acknowledge and combat how dominant epistemic frameworks shaping 
healthcare decision-making can perpetuate ableism.4 To be anti-ableist, genetic 
 
1 In what follows, we will purposely avoid the highly developed debates over the expressivist 
thesis, the open future argument, and related issues. Whatever position one takes in those debates, 
we take our overarching claim to hold. 
2 That is to say, while significant strides have been made by genetic counselors to better 
understand disability experiences, disability history, and disability activism, we hope to show that 
even an ideal form of such understanding, though important and laudable, will not go far enough. 
3 Patterns of thinking can involve lots of different features: concepts, ideas, principles, 
assumptions, biases (implicit and explicit), etc. 
4 By focusing on what it means to be “anti-ableist” as opposed to merely not ableist, we follow in 
the footsteps of scholars of racialization like Ibram X. Kendi, for whom the point is not whether or 
not one is racist, but what one is doing and how one acts to actively combat racism. Cf. (Kendi 
2019) 
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counselors must work towards not merely increases in information, but towards epistemic 
transformation. 
In section one, we provide a brief overview of disability theory. We canvas 
longstanding debates over what disability is, why and how these debates matter for 
genetic counselors, and the roots of historical tensions between disability communities 
and genetic counselors (Madeo et al. 2011). This discussion will involve an overview of 
disability rights critiques of prenatal testing, the import of social and post-social models 
of disability, and longstanding disagreements between disability rights and abortion 
rights/feminist choice theory more generally (A Asch 1999; Hodgson and Weil 2012a; 
Parens and Asch 2003; Shakespeare 2014). 
In section two, we turn to the concept of informed consent. We begin by 
discussing the history of informed consent in biomedicine as reaction to Tuskegee and 
other events of blatant medical injustice,  explaining how and why “fully informed 
consent” has come to be invoked as an explicit goal of genetic counseling (Johnston 
2017). Informed consent is often framed as an output of non-directive counseling, 
whereby a client becomes informed in dialogue with a counselor. Informedness is a 
constituent part of non-directive counseling because a client sufficiently informed in 
collaboration with a counselor is thought to have sufficient tools to make informed, 
legitimate decisions. We build on existing critiques of non-directiveness in order to 
complicate the role of informed consent, arguing that being fully informed is impossible 
and, even if it were, it is insufficient to achieve anti-ableist aims in the context of genetic 
counseling (Clarke 1991; 2017(A. L. Caplan 2017). 
In section three, we move from critical analysis to practical recommendations. 
We show how CIC (1) avoids communication practices that treat obtaining informed 
consent as an endpoint, (2) instead embeds consent within transformative dialogue and 
(3) challenges ableist epistemic frameworks that unreflectively place absolute value in 
“individual abilities” or “capacities” (Weil 2003).5 
I.   Disability Theory: A Brief History 
Prenatal genetic counseling is primarily about disability. To counsel about genetic 
variation, genetic mutations, or any other such concepts, is to counsel about genetic 
differences: the many expressions of which we ultimately describe as disabilities. But 
what, precisely, does that term mean? Thanks to nearly seventy years of disability 
activism across parts of the globe and fifty years of academic work in the 
interdisciplinary field of disability studies, a significant body of theoretical work and on-
the-ground organizing offers tools to answer this question. In what follows, we offer a 
brief overview of disability studies with an eye to its relevance for genetic counselors. 
 
5 An initial qualification is in order: there are some in disability studies and other domains that 
take the practice of genetic counseling to be inherently and irremediably problematic. We take no 
position on those claims in this piece. On the contrary, we assume that we are operating in a world 
in which genetic counseling is a staple service for those who can access it and a world in which 
many (though ideally all) genetic counselors aim to practice in a way that does justice to the 
experiences of various disability communities. 
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The concept of ‘disability’ is not decided by dictionaries or other practices of description. 
On the contrary, there is no uncontroversial definition because the concept of disability 
involves what Adrianne Asch calls a “boundary problem,” a problem the defining stakes 
of which are socio-political and which cannot be determined by mere appeals to 
authority, whether dictionaries, experts, or what have you (A Asch 1999). This is 
unsurprising once one recognizes that debates over disability cut to the heart of how we 
understand what it means to be human and how we distinguish between differing ways of 
being so—hardly uncontroversial matters. This is part of the reason why arguments 
concerning the meaning of disability show no sign of disappearing in the many academic 
and policy-related fields that engage with it (Garland-Thomson 2020; Nadelhoffer 2019; 
Parens 2017; Timpe Forthcoming). 
Yet, this presents a problem for genetic counselors. A sense of what disability 
means is essential for counselor-client communication. What are genetic counselors who 
are sensitive to the complexity of disability and sensitive to the responsibilities they have 
to disability communities to do, given disagreements over what disability means in the 
first place? To answer this question requires a brief dive into both disability theory and 
the more specific history of disability critiques of genetic counseling. 
Disability rights critiques of prenatal testing—whether with respect to maternal 
blood screening, conventional genetic testing, or non-invasive prenatal genetic tests—
have taken many forms over the years (Hodgson and Weil 2012b; Parens and Asch 
2000). One of the most basic, yet most important distinctions is between medical and 
social models of disability. In short, on medical models of disability, disability is an 
individual misfortune or tragedy due to a genetic or environmental cause. Unsurprisingly, 
medical models tend to construe disability as overwhelmingly negative, and adherents of 
this view see disability as something that ought to be cured or otherwise fixed and as 
something which benefits from medical intervention through elimination, correction, or 
the like. On social models, this idea is in more than one way turned on its head, for a 
fundamental distinction is made between ‘impairments,’ which refer to some atypicality 
of one’s body and mind, and ‘disability,’ which refers to the negative social ramifications 
of one’s impairment.  
However impaired someone might be, that does not explain how they are 
disabled for disability is ultimately a question of how societies and bodies interact. If, for 
whatever reason, my form of embodiment leads me to use a wheelchair as my primary 
form of mobility, what disadvantages me when I run into a staircase isn’t my body as 
much as it is those who decided to build stairs and not a ramp. What impedes the fantastic 
student of classics who happens to be blind from becoming a professor isn’t their body as 
much as it is a world that does not make braille and/or audio versions of texts easily 
accessible.6 There is a limit to this insight, of course, for one with neuropathic pain will 
not necessarily fare better thanks to accessible architecture or reading materials. There 
are some impairments that very clearly call for a medical fix, as disability studies 
 
6 As one might imagine, the distinction between medical and social models of disability has been 
endlessly refined and debated over many decades. For the purposes at hand, we are merely 
offering the “Disability 101” version of this distinction. 
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scholars like Susan Wendell and Tom Shakespeare have argued (Wendell 1996; 
Shakespeare 2014). 
Still, the distinction between medical and social models of disability matters for 
genetic counseling and decision-making concerning reproduction more generally because 
while such counselling aids individual decision-making—namely, concerning the health 
and well-being of a potential new person—that person’s ability to flourish ought to be 
understood not merely as a function of the presence or absence of impairment, but also in 
terms of the attitudes and design of the built and social world that they will come to 
inhabit. Consider one more example: being deaf (or Deaf – which some capitalize to 
emphasize Deafness as an identity with a relationship to communities centered around the 
use of signing) is an impairment in the sense that one’s hearing is not phenotypical. What 
makes someone who is deaf disabled, however, is a world in which most people do not 
know how to communicate in American Sign Language, social norms that uncritically 
assume the habits, needs, and cultural practices of hearing people as opposed to non-
hearing people, and the many stigmas signers face in a predominantly hearing world. 
Where strict adherents to a medical model might find it obvious to advocate for cochlear 
implants or other interventions thought to advance the presumptive good of typical 
hearing, those adopting a social model might advocate for the normalization of 
captioning, more access to American Sign Language instruction, and a recognition of the 
richness of Deaf culture.7  
There are many theories of disability, and the distinction between medical and 
social models is only the most basic. However basic, this distinction still illuminates the 
animating conflict between disability rights and genetic counseling. Prenatal genetic 
counseling tends toward medical model understandings of disability because the 
information gleaned in the course of prenatal testing is circumscribed within the medical 
and the genetic; it doesn’t yet bear on a person living in a socially, culturally, and 
historically shaped world. The decisions formed in genetic counseling spheres are by 
their nature related in direct ways to traits about the body, while disability in fact has a 
great deal to do with the societies that promote or thwart the ability of people with a wide 
array of bodies to flourish. An appreciation of the social model makes the following 
observation salient: by default, the theoretical and practical orientation of genetic 
counseling encourages medical model-type thinking about genetics in terms of what can 
be predicted about the body and in turn how medicine can fix (or not fix) whatever 
testing uncovers. 
Let us return, then, to the heart of the issue: What are genetic counselors who 
wish to take seriously the complexity of disability and who also recognize a 
responsibility to disability communities to do? And, to make matters more complicated, 
what are they to do in light of ongoing disagreements concerning how to understand the 
concept and meaning of disability (whether in pockets of disability activism or disability 
studies)? The answer is more simple than it seems. Whatever model of disability is at 
play, the upshot of disability theory as a whole is that we live in a world saturated by 
 
7 There is significant debate over the meaning of d/Deafness, and the discussion here is greatly 
simplified. Among many possible entry-points for those wanting to learn more, see (Mauldin 
2016). 
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ableism, and a just world requires everyone to be actively anti-ableist.8 That is to say, we 
live in a world where assumptions about ability and disability run rampant, assumptions 
that are overwhelmingly prejudicial towards disabled people of all sorts and stripes. 
Ableism is not just a question of people’s opinions, beliefs, or presumptions. On the 
contrary, ableism is baked into the way that people think about themselves and others as 
well as how they act—how, for example, political representation is configured, how labor 
laws are developed, how the built environment is constructed, etc. And, as we discuss at 
length in section III below, it is exceedingly rare to change how people think by merely 
presenting information to them. On the contrary, to change the foundation of how one 
experiences a given phenomenon requires transformation of how one knows, not simply 
adding or subtracting various pieces of “information” about it. Having now given a very 
cursory overview of some points of disability theory, we will turn to show how the 
central concepts of choice and consent too easily lead to additive, not transformative, 
changes. After laying out that critique, we will then develop our account of critically 
informed consent. 
II.  Choice & Consent 
  
Consent—and choice—are fundamental to the project of genetic counseling. By its 
nature, prenatal genetic counseling is an interpersonal exercise in informing and 
becoming informed. As Barbara Biesecker puts it, “the goal of reproductive genetic 
counseling is to promote the client's self‐determination in exercising choices” (Biesecker 
2001). Informed consent is both a formal procedure and a way of thinking. It is formal in 
that it has been codified such that clients must sign documents to indicate their 
understanding and choosing procedures and clinical encounters. It is a way of thinking in 
that genetic counseling operates via the logic that there is a certain measure of 
knowledge—of informedness—that authorizes a person to make autonomous and 
trustable decisions, and counseling can help them get there. This logic is in line with 
other forms of healthcare decision-making, where patients are furnished with 
information, and having information, demonstrated by signing informed consent 
paperwork, legitimizes consent and is understood to be a precondition for making 
independent healthcare choices. The nature of prenatal genetic testing, where the 
information gleaned about potential genetic abnormalities can be virtually all that is 
known about the specific tested fetus, raises the stakes of this process of informed 
consent. That is to say, virtually all that is known about a tested fetus is the information 
that prenatal testing offers. And the people doing the gestating, aided in understanding by 
genetic counselors, can use it as the predicate for significant choices. Informedness is 
taken as the condition sine qua non for making good significant choices, where what 
marks the “good” choice is the appreciation and uptake of relevant information, 
unconstrained by outside pressures. 
 
8 To recall from pg. one above, we here define ableism as a prejudice (analogous, but distinct from 
prejudices involved in sexism, racism, or homophobia) that presumes the “normal” able-body is 
better than an “abnormal” disabled-body. 
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Of course, unconstrained choice is impossible: societal norms and values that 
produce the meaning of disability for any given client are also present within 
reproductive decision-making and the institutions that exist to support it. The history of 
genetic counseling bears this out. Since the mid-20th century, the field has operated with 
the effect, on the one hand, of elimination of genetic diseases leading to impairment and, 
on the other, with the aim of helping clients prepare and understand genetic conditions in 
a “neutral” manner (Biesecker 2001). Many genetic counselors have long pushed back 
against the elimination of impairment as an explicit goal, and while their efforts have 
done important work to change attitudes and pedagogical models, tension between 
facilitation of reproductive autonomy and the promotion of anti-ableist aims mean that 
the elimination of impairment is still a key outcome of much genetic testing and 
counseling (Hawkins et al. 2013; Mansfield, Hopfer, and Marteau 1999).  
The situation is even more complex than this, however, for the reasons that cause 
people to end up in a genetic counselor's office mediate the kinds of choices that will be 
available to them in the first place. These include the catalysts for testing, such as family 
history or previous miscarriage or advanced maternal age, that testing occurs, the other 
providers involved in testing, the kinds of healthcare available to them thanks to wealth, 
income, and other vectors of their economic situation, and more. Economic resources 
beget more access to genetic testing, which on one hand represents greater access to the 
information upon which to base choices, and on the other, strongly predisposes making 
particular kinds of choices (Zhang 2020). The social contexts in which decisions 
predicated on genetic information are made are also constrained by factors such as the 
healthcare, social, and school systems available, and attitudes of family and community 
toward disability and care. These constraints are important because they provide context 
and motivations for reproductive decisions. But they also hint at how those decisions are 
profoundly shaped by factors well beyond individual clients. These factors include 
aspects of choice itself, such as the stories of choice and control told about genetic testing 
(Lippman 1991) and the paradox of constraint that more choice can engender (Levitt 
2014).  In other words, even when the purpose of genetic counseling is imagined by all 
parties to facilitate free and informed choice, choices are always mediated and always 




The practice of informed consent results from an attempt to ensure that choice is as free 
as possible, but, of course, the mere provision of information cannot overcome the 
constraints imposed by the outside world. Even the information that generates 
informedness is not neutral; there are necessarily decisions made about what is included, 
what is left out, and what is unknowable. As will be discussed in section three, critically 
informed consent acknowledges that the provision of information is not without bias and 
understood as a goal of the practice of genetic counseling, it argues that such biases must 
be deployed in the service of epistemic transformation: to actively shift the profession of 
genetic counseling toward being an anti-ableist practice. 
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Genetic counselors are taught that informed consent is an important goal of their 
practice (Biesecker 2001; Rantanen et al. 2008). This is understandable, for a key task of 
genetic counseling is indeed to generate informedness: to furnish clients not only with 
information about the landscape of genetic knowing (what particular markers mean, how 
they are known, how to think about probabilistic risk, etc.) but also to offer bespoke 
information about clients’ own genetic information. Non-directiveness is thought to be 
key (albeit contested), because it is a method, if not the method, by which genetic 
counselors convey information without inflecting it via their own values. In this light, 
information is imagined to shape client decisions in ways that allow for the expression of 
their own autonomous values. Clients need to know enough about how genetic 
information works in order to understand what their own information means so that they 
can act on it. This is the consent part of informed consent: consent is a kind of choice, 
and in genetic counseling and beyond, its legitimacy is authorized by virtue of it being 
sufficiently informed so that decisions can be trusted, both by clients and by other entities 
such as medical providers, family members, and the law.  
Emphasis on choice, made manifest in informed consent, has an important 
history in genetic counseling. In biomedicine broadly, informed consent became codified 
as a way to prevent atrocities like those in the Tuskegee Study from happening again. The 
commission investigating Tuskegee found that a key procedural injustice contributing to 
the suffering and unnecessary syphilis infection of thousands of Black men and their 
families was that those men were never asked for their consent to participate in the study. 
In the Belmont Report, authored in response to the study, the Belmont commission 
outlined a mandate for what they called “respect for persons.” It requires that “subjects, 
to the degree that they are capable, be given the opportunity to choose what shall or shall 
not happen to them. This opportunity is provided when adequate standards for informed 
consent are satisfied.” (The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979). This is a forceful expression of the value 
of individual autonomy, and the translation of a right to make decisions for oneself into 
medical practice.9 In this paper, we do not argue that such choosing is unimportant. 
Rather, we argue that it is more complicated—and less individual—than prevailing 
notions about informed consent suggest.  
We offer this cursory gloss of the history of informed consent to point 
specifically to the problem of paternalism and how it historically gave rise to 
biomedicine’s keen emphasis on individual autonomy as a solution. We understand 
paternalism in two senses. First, where “doctor knows best,” and fails to furnish the 
patient with information necessary for making individual health decisions. Second, where 
“medicine knows best,” and decides that, for example, the health of poor Black men in 
Tuskegee Alabama is an acceptable sacrifice in the name of population health and 
knowledge. Bioethics gained prominence in the USA, in particular, in large part to public 
reaction to Tuskegee (Jonsen 1997; Washington 2008). Bioethics’ emphasis on the 
protection of individual autonomy, through the informed consent mechanisms outlined in 
 
9 As a reviewer rightly noted, the model of consent that initially developed in biomedicine was a 
research model. Importing this model into clinical care writ large (and genetic counseling, 
specifically) is perhaps one source of these troubles. 
Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Genetic Counseling 
 
 
Dietz & Reynolds Reforming Informed Consent 8 
the Belmont Report, arose to gird against both sorts of paternalism. In this way, the 
emphasis on protecting autonomy is understandable and needed: clients and patients are 
important knowers, and better suited to make decisions about their own well-being than 
doctors—particularly when doctors act maleficently.  
At the same time, such a forceful expression of the need for choices to be free 
and individual disregards the ways that they often cannot be. Choices, particularly 
reproductive choices, do not exist in a vacuum and are rather conditioned by the reality of 
the world in which they sit. Attitudes about disability, the resources of available school 
systems and social programs, the quality of accessible healthcare, the influence of racism: 
all bear on such decisions. The fortification of individual autonomy, and the mere 
provision of more information, are inadequate responses to the inequitable milieu in 
which reproductive choices take place. In the case of Tuskegee, it is true that Black men 
were not asked for their consent to participate in trials that would leave them with 
untreated syphilis. But it is also the case that merely asking for their consent would not 
address the larger factors that rendered the trials unjust: the racism of the time and place 
of its occurrence, under-resourcing of local health care systems, a study design that 
presumed the biological difference and inferiority of Black people and justified harm in 
the name of confirming it. In other words, the presence of consent would not have 
transformed the trial, or the social systems in which it took place, into one that was 
ethical. Consent undertaken as an individual expression of choice is necessary, but 
insufficient for rendering the system in which it takes place just.  
Informed consent is necessary, but also insufficient, as a mechanism to combat 
the paternalism that has caused long legacies of significant harm. As an individual matter, 
and as a way that genetic counselors can facilitate and respect the reproductive autonomy 
of their clients, it is certainly a worthwhile aspiration. But it should be understood as the 
starting point, not the ending point. Informed consent itself also transforms the messiness 
and interdependence of the outside world into a decision where responsibility is placed 
on the individual. In this way, it is a tool of simplification and responsibility shifting and 
a way by which some liability is shifted away from providers; it is a bureaucratic tool that 
we find simultaneously important and insufficient for disability justice. In response, we 
encourage genetic counselors to think about underlying structural injustices in order to 
translate their responsibilities to individual clients into transformations of consciousness: 
much like you aren’t “racist or not racist”; but racist or anti-racist, genetic counselors 




Genetics in general, and genetic counseling more specifically, cannot but understand 
itself in relation to eugenics. Indeed, much writing on the subject begins with an explicit 
genealogical discussion of how and why non-directiveness came to be a guiding principle 
for practice (Patterson and Sattz 2002). To understand a population at the level of the 
 
10 In part three, we elaborate the stakes of this critique and offer a way of thinking both about 
client autonomy and the impact of social structures within which decisions are made by thinking 
in terms of epistemic transformation rather than information provision. 
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genome is to facilitate its management (on at least some level), which cannot escape 
deliberation over values and over who and what sorts of people ought to come into being, 
how they should be treated, etc. Non-directiveness works to create an explicit separation 
between the “experts” and those making individual decisions about who comes to be and 
who does not. A key ethos of mainstream genetics researchers and genetic counselors is 
one that takes active steps to acknowledge the legacy of eugenics, implementing policies 
and practices that endeavor to render them impossible, outside the scope of practice, and 
a set of verboten and antiquated norms. Genetic counseling is motivated by the need to 
counter the legacy of paternalism so viciously embodied in various forms of egregiously 
immoral social engineering.11 But in a field whose remit is to facilitate decisions about 
how to act on genetic information, the question of how to do that is one that requires 
critical vigilance and meaningful interrogation. 
Non-directiveness creates a separation between the production of genetic 
information and its deployment. Instead of locating knowledge about what genetic 
information is and means in the same hands as those who decide how to act on it—where 
‘act’ generally implies ‘decides what kinds of people should come into being’—non-
directiveness assigns genetic counselors to the role of information-providers and clients 
to the role of decision-makers. Non-directiveness is, of course, complicated. It is “a 
principle, not a goal” (Biesecker 2001); it is “a technique by which genetics professionals 
explore whether clients can be trusted to make autonomous decisions within a climate of 
uncertainty (Arribas-Ayllon and Sarangi 2014); it has “has served as the central ethos for 
genetic counselling for the past decades and has provided both practical and ethical 
guidance to professionals (Rantanen et al. 2008). In other words, non-directiveness exists 
not as an absolute or measurable goal, but as a disposition, a way of thinking, an 
orientation. It is a general sense that in order to promote client autonomy and facilitate 
informed consent, counseling should be non-directive. It should furnish information, 
answer questions, acknowledge uncertainty and complexity (and in so doing, its own 
impossibility)—but remain a guiding force in the background, cautioning against the 
harms of genetic counselors making decisions for their clients.  
The social factors that produce disability also generate a responsibility for 
genetic counselors to transform anti-ableist ways of thinking – not merely by providing 
more information (though that is certainly important), but also by helping clients to think 
differently about disability. To be sure, our interrogation of non-directiveness is not 
 
11 The legacy of Nazi experimentation looms large in the establishment of non-directiveness as a 
backstop against eugenics (Resta 1997). Still, as a reviewer notes, the most immediate foil is not in 
fact Nazi eugenics, but instead late-19th and early-20th century social eugenics programs in the 
U.S. E.g., the Eugenics Record Office in the U.S.A., and Margaret Sanger’s overall goals in the 
founding of Planned Parenthood. The reviewer writes, “Alexandra Stern and Devon Stillwell have 
situated historically the development of non-directive prenatal genetic counseling against the 
backdrop of these more coercive eugenics projects, which sought to limit reproduction among 
certain racial groups and persons with disabilities. But there’s also the issues described by Gervais 
and Bosk in the “Prescribing Our Future” volume, where non-directiveness was the default mode 
because medical geneticists with no communication or counseling training were initially returning 
results to clients” (Stern 2012; Stillwell 2015; Gervais 2020; Bosk 2020). 
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novel.12 On the contrary, we see this argument as building upon decades of work that has 
complicated, pushed back on, and otherwise transformed the centrality of non-
directiveness: our aim here is to offer a translation of those critiques into something that 
can be concretely deployed in practice. We thus draw upon and expand such work by 
arguing that non-directiveness is not only impossible, but also undesirable.13 To be anti-
ableist requires being directive, at least with respect to how a client is pushed to think.14 
As our arguments here aim to make clear, there are ways to be directive in the practice of 
genetic counseling that are entirely defensible, morally, practically, and otherwise. One 
way that we suggest doing so is by aiming for transformation with respect to the 
epistemic framework within and through which a given client understands the meaning of 
disability.  
Given their role in decisions that render judgements on the possibility and 
impossibility of disabled lives, genetic counselors must, we contend, take an active role 
in transforming their clients’ larger epistemic relationship to ableism in making 
reproductive decisions, the communal (rather than individual) effects of those decisions, 
and how ableist thinking may not be a conscious facet of their analytical toolbox, but is 
nevertheless a presence. 
III.  Critically Informed Consent 
  
The concept of critically informed consent is premised upon work concerning how people 
filter information in the fields of social epistemology and psychology. A number of 
common cognitive biases and habits are well-known today. For example, implicit bias 
refers to the way that people act on stereotypes and prejudices without realizing or 
intending to (Brownstein 2019). Confirmation bias describes the way that people 
assimilate and act on information that is consistent, rather than inconsistent, with their 
prior conceptions (Khan et al. 2015). Anchoring bias refers to the way that people will 
 
12 Some assert the impossibility of non-directiveness: the complexity of genetic information and 
the range of decisions that it potentiates couple with structural limitations on what genetic 
counselors can know and the inescapability of bias in human interactions to render true non-
directiveness impossible (Clarke 2017). Others note that as a mechanism for promoting autonomy, 
it may also fall flat: one study found that clients of lower socioeconomic status or those judged to 
be “highly concerned” received more directive counseling(Michie et al. 1997). In a review of 
arguments against the non-directiveness principle (NDP), Christoph Rehmann-Sutter summarizes 
them as follows: “(i) NDP can be against the best interests of the individuals concerned; (ii) NDP 
has ideological elements that do not adequately represent the counselling ethos; (iii) NDP was 
historically a defensive tool that protected the interests of geneticists against social criticism and 
against litigation; (iv) NDP falsely assumes individual responsibility and hides the shared 
responsibility of other social actors” (Rehmann-Sutter 2009).  
13 That is to say, undesirable at least on traditional views of non-directiveness. Consider Weil and 
Seymour’s attempts to define non-directiveness as a positive duty of GCs as well as Deem’s 
arguments that these end up collapsing into a broader principle of respect for autonomy (Weil 
2003; Kessler 1997; Deem 2016). Our thanks to a reviewer for these insights.  
14 That is to say, we are not endorsing being directive in the traditional sense within genetic 
counseling: pushing a client toward a specific decision (much like a pediatrician would be 
recommending/pushing an option). 
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too heavily focus on initial pieces of information provided to them at the expense of 
appropriately assessing forthcoming pieces of information (T.D. Wilson 1996). Yet, these 
cognitive filters do not have to do with how we understand the world as such. That is to 
say, they are about how we think, not about the frameworks through which we think in 
general. Take the following example. If I hold implicit biases concerning engineers—that 
they have poor social skills, are exceptional at math, and dislike ambiguity—this will 
affect how I interact with engineers in a host of ways. So will the matrix of social factors 
that have (for instance) made engineering a male-dominated field and that have tended to 
devalue jobs typically held by women. But even if I overcome all of those biases, the 
larger background beliefs at play that make the concept of an “engineer” something that 
is communicable remain. For example: the belief in modern scientific methods (as 
opposed to alternative systems of knowledge), the belief that abilities (like being good at 
math or “social skills”) are properties of people, and the belief that knowledge exists on 
certain gradients (such as ranging from being clear to being opaque). Those might seem 
like obvious truths to most readers, but that is precisely the problem. The background or 
framing beliefs with which people typically operate strike them as obviously true. So, 
what, you might be wondering, does this have to do with critically informed consent?  
 The problem of ableism is not, in the end, about a lack of information concerning 
disability, information that would include all the studies showing many people with 
disabilities to have similar quality of life as non-disabled people (Amundson 2005) or 
information that demonstrates widespread stigma against disabled people that leads to 
hate crimes, underemployment, and high levels of interpersonal abuse (Sherry 2010). The 
problem of ableism is, at its core, about the background organization of one’s knowing, 
judging, and valuing in general (Reynolds and Peña-Guzmán 2019). Put simply, the 
problem of ableism is about whether one’s reflective relationship to the multifaceted 
phenomenon of disability is sufficiently critical or not. 
 Let us retrace our steps. As we discussed in the section on disability theory 
above, the dominant medical paradigm for conceptualizing embodied difference is 
between ‘ability’ and ‘disability’ or ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality,’ conceptual pairs that 
often amount to the same in such contexts. On the medical model, to be able-bodied and 
normal is assumed to be both good and a goal; to be disabled and abnormal is assumed to 
be both bad and to be avoided/fixed/overcome. And, given the larger socio-cultural 
dynamics of our current epoch, this is also the dominant paradigm with which most 
genetic counseling clients operate. Yet, as we argued above, this paradigm is not simply 
empirically dubious—it is also morally problematic. To assume that all lives lived with 
disability are lives worse off is the most egregious form of “common sense” ableism. 
 Critically informed consent takes the medical model of disability head on. But it 
aims not merely at what information clients have about disability, but about the 
framework clients use to make sense of the distinction between disability and ability in 
the first place. To echo above, the deeper challenge of ableism is not primarily a question 
of exposure to disability-positive information—whether it be in the form of social 
scientific studies demonstrating quality of life, anecdotes from families, or what have 
you. The deeper challenge of ableism is the framework in which broad value judgments 
can be assuredly inferred from claims about specific ability states such that responses like 
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the following occur: “I never shared it [the results] with any family [members]. My dad 
would treat [the child] differently even though the results don’t say anything definitive. If 
she drops a ball or says something really stupid, he would say, ‘oh, there’s something 
wrong with her; she’s retarded, or she’s autistic.’ He would just go there (Werner‐Lin et 
al. 2016; cf. Reynolds 2020).” 
 For example, one might consider oneself progressive on issues concerning 
disability and still think that a child with Down syndrome will live a less flourishing life 
and that one should not follow through with such a pregnancy. Such thinking is rooted in 
assumptions about what sort of well-being will follow from the “capacities” of a given 
individual in concert with the social reality in a given place. Disability theory, on the 
whole, has shown such assumptions to be more often misguided than not. For example, 
we know that most people with Down syndrome live happy, flourishing lives (Kaposy 
2018). While social contexts of course matter, they matter for any child regardless of 
their disability status, and they are profoundly impacted by how that child is treated and 
regarded as they develop (Stramondo 2020). In other words, it is difficult to make an 
argument that social context will matter in categorically distinct ways between someone 
with Down syndrome versus someone without Down syndrome—if, that is, one refuses 
to commit what Adrienne Asch called the “sin of synecdoche,” the practice of treating a 
part (like having an extra chromosome) for the whole (the varied phenotypical 
differences that brings about in relationship with a given social, cultural, historical 
context) (Adrienne Asch and Wasserman 2005). Not being born with Trisomy 21 does 
not necessitate any guarantees about having or not having socially valuable intellectual or 
social skills, about developing or not developing drug dependencies that can run any life 
adrift, about living with or without severe depression or anxiety, or any number of other 
factors. Not being born with Trisomy 21 does not necessitate guarantees about living a 
happy life “on the whole.” And if the primary concern of parent is about the extent to 
which they are perceived to be “normal” and not the flourishing of their child, then we 
are outside of the moral sphere of reproductive ethics.15  
 This is why critically informed consent is a practice aimed at undermining 
ableism. The decision-making paradigms for much of the reproductive sphere are about 
“prevention,” “information,” and “intervention.” We are suggesting that all of these can 
reinforce injustice against disabled people insofar as the conceptual framework that 
underwrites these terms is left to “common sense” about the meaning of ability and 
disability. To argue for CIC is not to argue that the practice of genetic counseling should 
stop or that it necessarily contributes to injustices against disabled people. On the 
contrary, to argue for CIC is to argue that how genetic differences are explained, 
understood, and communicated must take the problem of ableism and the epistemic 
frameworks underwriting it head on.16  
 
15 To want a child “like oneself” and use that as a defensible basis for one’s reproductive choices 
is an especially egregious sort of narcissism the analysis of which we simply set to the side here. 
See (Rulli 2014). 
16 A reviewer noted, “Someone might respond that CIC embodies the very concern of non-
directive counseling, and that it is just a matter of giving certain kinds of information to women or 
couples. In other words, what’s really directive about CIC, if it doesn’t aim to move the discussion 
in a certain direction?” As we hope to have made clear, CIC is directive in the sense of moving the 
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We have suggested that for genetic counselors to be aware of the problem of 
ableism is not enough. Genetic counseling as a practice must become actively anti-
ableist. While informed consent is undoubtedly crucial to the provision of care that both 
meets client needs and is attentive to concerns about justice, we have argued that when 
treated as an endpoint rather than as a starting point, it can reinforce existing injustices at 
the level of how people think. To be sure, knowledge about the lived experiences of 
people with disabilities is vitally important, but that knowledge must be accompanied by 
an understanding of how ableism operates as a habit of thought, a habit all too often 
operating seamlessly in the background. We will not achieve a more just world through 
an uncritical belief that objective facts and informed consent will on their own lead 
naturally toward just outcomes; on the contrary, justice requires an interrogation of how 
what we think of as “objective” facts are often in fact inflected with biases and operate 
through epistemic frameworks that support the very unjust world in which we live. It is 
then not merely a matter of acknowledging these biases but working against the larger 
epistemic frameworks through which our values, judgments, and decision-making are 
shaped. Practicing critically informed consent is one way for the profession of genetic 
counseling to more effectively work towards a just world. By doing so, it is our hope that 




discussion in a certain direction: but that direction is less about a particular decision and more 
about the framework for thinking about ability and disability at play. 
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